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On the Enlightenment of Current Asset Price","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1100486117","media":"钟正生经济分析","summary":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击","content":"<p><html><head></head><body><b>First, the complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s are extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, crude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively quench inflation; Furthermore, the supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the chronically overshooting inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations and triggered a wage-price spiral that has deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the \"fault\" and \"merit\" of the Federal Reserve.</b>In 1970-1979, the Fed's tightening was not firm enough for many reasons: first, the Fed once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Second, the Fed's primary goal at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, Fed decisions are also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its duty, strengthened rate hike and controlled money supply. Since then, the Fed has worked to stabilize inflation expectations for a longer period of time, reshaping the Fed's credibility.</p><p><b>Third, \"soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States experienced four rounds of economic recession, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82), which were the result of a combination of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh: first, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time in the early stage of recession; Secondly, the Fed's rate hike can't be too aggressive, and it even needs to cut interest rates in time when the recession comes; Finally, if a new supply shock occurs, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>4. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s-1980s, inflation became the bellwether of capital markets. The CPI inflation rate in the United States peaked in three stages, and U.S. stocks bottomed out in stages. However, in this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and monetary policy logic. Over time, the U.S. debt market has traded less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\". In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. After the \"Great Stagflation\" ended, safe-haven assets such as the US dollar still performed positively for a long time.</p><p><b>Fifth, new enlightenment to the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although this round of Fed has also \"made mistakes\", it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation; Third, this round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of \"hard landing\"; Fourth, the price trend of this round of major assets may be strongly similar to that of the 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>US stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment range may not be too deep, and the rebound or recession will be realized.<b>2）</b>US debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession is realized. It is necessary to wait until the monetary policy clearly begins to relax.<b>3）</b>US dollar: \"Strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar may need to fall back in US Treasury yields.</p><p><i>Risk: The US economy is weaker than expected, new supply shocks appear, and non-US financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the CPI inflation rate in the United States has once risen above 9%, the real GDP has shrunk quarter-on-quarter for two consecutive quarters, the (quasi) stagflation characteristics of the economy have become more distinct, and the capital market has also experienced large fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has constantly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current economic environment in the United States is very similar to that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve will also fully learn from the coping experience at that time, and do something but not do something, in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation\".</p><p>What is the current inflationary pressure in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the U.S. economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in the \"spring\"? In this report, with questions about the present, we revisit the inflation, monetary policy, economic growth and asset price performance during the \"Great Stagflation\" period of the United States in 1970s and 1980s, and try to understand the logic and laws, so as to enlighten us to judge the trend of the United States economy, monetary policy and market in the future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s are extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, crude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively quench inflation; Furthermore, the supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the chronically overshooting inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations and triggered a wage-price spiral that has deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a high inflation crisis, and the CPI inflation rate was generally above 5%, with a peak of 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States has risen rapidly at a rate of more than 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI broke 5% year-on-year, which began a 13-year era of \"high inflation\". From 1969 to 1982, the year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States showed three peaks, with the peaks in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%) and March 1980 (14.8%) respectively. In February 1982, CPI fell back below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1965-70, blind fiscal and monetary expansion fostered higher inflation.</b>With the economic reconstruction coming to an end after World War II and the rise of European and Asian economies, the economic growth momentum of the United States has weakened, but the blind stimulation at the policy level has led to obvious overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States continued to be higher than the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of the potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of U.S. economic growth at that time were stimulated by policies. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the real unemployment rate basically remained within 4%. At the time, the role of fiscal stimulus was stronger than that of currency. Federal expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the United States increased by 3.2 percentage points from 1966-68, and the deficit rate expanded from 0.2 percent in 1965 to 2.8 percent in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance. In June, then-President Johnson signed the Revenue Control Act of 1968, which supplemented fiscal revenue by raising taxes. In August of the same year, the Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" to hedge the impact of tax increases, adding fire to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1971-74, brutal price controls turned \"short pain\" into \"long pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. However, in practice, the scope of price control continued to expand, and it was not until 1974 that the US government completely removed its intervention in prices. During this period, except in special circumstances, all price increases of goods and services need to be approved by the government. In mid-1972, the CPI inflation rate in the United States fell back below 3%. This time price control, seen as a special case of full-scale peacetime government intervention in prices in American economic history, is also considered a failed attempt. This is because the price limit measures not only curb the price rise, but also seriously dampen the enthusiasm of production enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of social commodities, which laid the groundwork for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the \"Watergate Scandal\" and the new President Carter came to power, and the price control measures gradually lapsed. Slightly comically, both the Nixon and Carter administrations tried to control prices through verbal \"exhortation\". For example, when Carter first came to power, he encouraged people to buy \"bargains\": \"Be daring to show off to others, pick out your own bargains, and be proud of it\". These admonitions are almost futile for controlling prices. The CPI inflation rate in the United States has broken 5% again in April 1973, and since then has risen all the way to a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>One food crisis and two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on U.S. prices.</b>In 1973, the grain of the former Soviet Union failed due to bad weather, and then entered the international market to buy grain in large quantities, which triggered the worst grain crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of food CPI in the United States once rose above 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: the Saudi-led OPEC member states announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of crude oil in the World Bank jumped from $2.7/barrel in September 1973 to $13/barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From early 1979 to early 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, followed by the \"Iran-Iraq War\" in Iran and Iraq, which led to a sharp decline in global oil production. World Bank international oil prices rose from less than $15/barrel in December 1978 to more than $40/barrel in November 1979. In March, 1980, the U.S. energy CPI reached a peak of 47.1% year-on-year, and the U.S. CPI immediately reached a peak of 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1970-80, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations got out of control, and with the help of trade union forces, the \"wage-price spiral\" gradually took shape.</b>After the CPI inflation rate has been higher than 2% or even higher than 5% for many years in a row, American residents have lost their original confidence in prices, and their inflation expectations have risen. At that time, both the Federal Reserve and the market had limited awareness and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely cited University of Michigan survey and Cleveland Fed model are expected to be born only around 1980. The earliest tool to monitor inflation expectations in The United States was The Livingston Survey, born in 1946, which summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banking and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually risen since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, inflation expectations have also risen sharply with the headline inflation rate. The reverse impact of inflation expectation on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: labor demands a wage increase, and then residents' spending power and the cost pressure of enterprises rise, which at the same time contributes to the price increase, that is, the formation of a \"wage-price spiral\".<b>In particular, in the 1970s, the power of trade unions in the United States was huge, and the transmission of wage demands was smooth:</b>According to the data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, union members in the United States accounted for nearly 30% of the total social employees, and there were 200-400 strikes of more than 1,000 people every year (this number has been below 30 every year since 2000). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the CPI inflation rate in the United States dropped to about 5-7%, but the average hourly wage of non-agricultural and non-managers in the United States increased by 6-8% year-on-year, which was continuously higher than the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of rising wages prevented a further retreat in inflation and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1970-79, the Fed's policy response was relatively negative, continuing to \"lag behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, the policy interest rate and inflation trend in the United States showed a strong synchronization, which reflected that the Federal Reserve was \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a long time. In May 1969, the third month after the inflation rate broke 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate kept rising for about half a year before it began to fall back. In the second half of 1973, when the inflation rate in the United States was still rising, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates under economic pressure, and then the inflation rate accelerated. In 1978, the policy interest rate in the United States was basically the same as the inflation rate, and kept rising step by step until December 1978, when the monthly rate of federal funds rose above 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate, but soon the policy interest rate began to lag behind the inflation rate again. Later, when the policy interest rate in the United States was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation dropped significantly, and the Federal Reserve took the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker raised interest rates sharply to fight inflation; In mid-1981, the U.S. policy interest rate reached a peak of more than 19%, and in October of the same year, the CPI dropped month-on-month and year-on-year at the same time; Since then, the inflation rate of Federal Funds rate has continued to be 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI, and the inflation rate has continued to fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The \"fault\" and \"merit\" of the Federal Reserve</b></p><p><b>In 1970-1979, the Fed was not firm enough in tightening, including both a lack of awareness of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy and a lack of independence of monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its duty, strengthened rate hike and controlled money supply. Since then, the Fed has been working to stabilize inflation expectations for a longer period of time, reshaping the Fed's credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1. Reasons for the Fed's hesitation</b></p><p><b>The Fed continued to \"fall behind the curve\" in 1970-1979 for a number of reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Fed once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\".</b>At that time, the Federal Reserve was divided on the causes of high inflation, and tended to think that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, and then monetary policy chose to respond negatively. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve led by Burns believed that union power triggered cost-driven inflation, and then advocated \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. It also contributed to the wage and price freeze that was later imposed by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns also argued that \"improper fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\".</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated monetary policy logic, and the Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation). Therefore, the Fed's primary goal of monetary policy is to achieve \"full employment\", hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy tilts more towards the job market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred at the same time, the Fed once thought that inflation would not continue to deteriorate. For example, the 1978-79 Miller Fed argued that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above the full employment level (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, Fed decisions are also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then president and lacked independence, and vacillated in balancing the relationship between inflation and growth. In hindsight, the Fed's tolerance of inflation in the 1970s may be exactly what the rulers wanted to see: on the one hand, the rulers didn't want the Fed to undermine economic growth and affect votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also regarded as a hidden tax means, because the increase of nominal wages increases the progressiveness of the whole tax system, resulting in a sharp increase in fiscal revenue. The data shows that the proportion of personal income tax in GDP in the United States increased significantly during the high inflation periods of 1969-70, 1974 and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2. The exploits of the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", took curbing inflation as its duty, and firmly rate hike and controlled the money supply. Although it \"created\" the economic recession, it finally defeated inflation.</b>In August, 1979, Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the \"monetary school\" view represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve led by him made the core position of monetary policy for price stability more clear, and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy goal, and then made a substantial rate hike, making the Federal Funds rate higher than the CPI inflation rate, so as to achieve the goal of controlling money supply. In March 1980, Volcker carried out an ill-advised but short-lived credit control experiment (the \"Special Credit Restriction Scheme\") to slow down the rate hike, but then resumed monetary tightening, which eventually pushed Federal Funds rate to a peak of more than 20% in mid-1981. The sharp rate hike, while bringing about a recession, ultimately helped inflation fall back.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In addition, in the Volcker and Greenspan era, the Fed established a new \"nominal anchor\" to stabilize inflation expectations and reshape the Fed's credibility, which is also an important background for the return of US prices to long-term stability in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after the \"Great Stagflation\", the original expectation of price stability suffered serious damage. Even in the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve defined its money supply target and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy was still questioned. It is not clear to the public whether the Fed can maintain its focus on inflation for the long term and has the ability to influence price movements in the medium and long term. Therefore, Volcker and his next Federal Reserve President Greenspan are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and finally re-establishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complicated and long process: Volcker's experience of defeating inflation is a good starting point, and then the Fed shifts from money supply targeting to \"implicit inflation targeting\".</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve pegs on the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap\" at the same time. In fact, it sets the policy interest rate through the Taylor Rule, pursues a stable medium-and long-term inflation target, and achieves stable economic growth. In terms of inflation expectation management, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, and at the same time strengthens communication with the capital market, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The post-Volcker monetary policy framework achieved long-term results in price stability, which led to the later era of Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States experienced four rounds of economic recession, which was the result of a combination of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct dampening effect on consumption and drives the Federal Reserve to rate hike and further curb investment. Therefore, the degree of recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh.</b></p><p><b>3.1. Three drivers of economic recession</b></p><p><b>According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four rounds of recession in the 1970s and 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>U.S. real GDP fell from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970 year over year, but the economy barely shrank. The U.S. unemployment rate, on the other hand, climbed significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a stage high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States declined from 5.6% in 1973 year-on-year, and it has shrunk year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest quarter-on-quarter shrinkage of 2.3%. The U.S. unemployment rate has been above 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a phase low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, and has since declined slowly.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>Real GDP in the United States shrank sharply by 8% in the second quarter of 1980, but only 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 6.3 percent to a peak of 7.8 percent. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy began to recover immediately, with GDP rising sharply by 7.7% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter, and the unemployment rate began to fall in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months)</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has shrunk year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest shrinkage of 2.6%. The unemployment rate in the United States began to recover significantly from a period low of 7.2% in August 1981, broke 8% in November of the same year, reached a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly declined, only to fall below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the recession drivers: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflation trends at that time, the two show a very close correlation:<b>The nodes of the U.S. economic recession all correspond to the time when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, the peak of CPI inflation in 1970 coincided with the beginning of the unemployment rebound and economic recession; In 1973-75, this round of unemployment rebound and the time when the economy was recognized as a recession were all after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%; In early 1980, when the CPI inflation rate hit an extremely high level of over 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If inflation is still rising when the recession occurs, the U.S. economy continues to downward; Only after inflation retreated did the U.S. economy begin to recover.</b>For example, in late 1970, the U.S. economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell back below 5%; In 1975, when the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the GDP growth rate of the United States turned positive from the previous month, and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared with the policy interest rate, the negative correlation between the inflation rate in the United States and the growth rate of private consumption is more obvious. Especially in the 1980s, when the policy interest rate jumped sharply, the inflation rate had fallen early, and private consumption began to pick up at that time, indicating that the easing of inflation has obviously helped the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Recession driver number two: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the cooling effect of the Fed's rate hike on the economy at that time was obvious:<b>When the US economy is overheating, the cooling effect of rate hike on the economy can be described as immediate:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the PMI of U.S. manufacturing exceeded 60, and the rate hike of the Federal Reserve rapidly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>While the U.S. economy itself was in a downturn or even a recession, rate hike deepened the magnitude of the economic contraction:</b>For example, in mid-1974, after the policy interest rate reached its peak, the downturn of the US economy accelerated, and the US GDP shrank sharply by 3.7% in the third quarter; From March to April 1980, after the monthly rate of federal funds reached a stage high of more than 17%, the U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% in the second quarter of the same year.<b>On the contrary, interest rate cuts can help the economy recover:</b>In December 1970, when policy interest rates fell below inflation, the U.S. economy was immediately in a state of recovery; The U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975 when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and brought the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below inflation in early 1975.<b>However, premature and premature rate cuts when inflation is not effectively controlled could end in \"inflation repeats + higher rate hike\", which could lead to a greater recession or delay a recovery that should have started earlier:</b>At the beginning of 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy continued, the U.S. economy still entered a recession; In May 1980, the monthly rate of federal funds had dropped to about 11% (supplemented by credit control), and the US economy temporarily left the recession zone in August. However, since then, inflation repeatedly forced the Federal Reserve to choose more rate hike, and in 1981, the US economy fell into a new round of deeper recession.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared with inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rate and private investment (lagging by 1 year) is more pronounced. In the second half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly; In 1981, when the Federal Reserve renewed its sharp rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation also declined significantly during this period, indicating that private investment is more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of recession: supply shock.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which weighed on U.S. growth in many ways, triggered recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks have raised CPI inflation, and rising consumer prices have dampened aggregate demand. Especially,<b>Supply shocks have triggered higher costs for energy consumption and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of consumption of energy goods and services in private consumption in the United States rose from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, and it didn't drop significantly until after 1985.<b>Second, supply shocks have increased the cost of U.S. oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10/barrel, and net U.S. oil imports in 1974 were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that the increase in oil prices will drag down the US GDP by about 21.9 billion dollars by increasing the net import cost, dragging down the nominal growth rate of GDP by 1.4 percentage points; Similarly, rising net oil import costs after the second oil crisis dragged down nominal U.S. GDP growth by 2.8 percentage points in 1979.<b>Third, supply shocks triggered a shortage of raw materials, weakening U.S. industrial production capacity.</b>After the two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the total industrial production index of the United States declined sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks, it can be found that at the time of the first shock, the inflation rate of CPI in the United States was lower, while the inflation rate of PPI was higher, and then the impact of industrial production was deeper, which also reflected that the impact of supply shock on economic output was more mainly manifested in the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2. What the degree of recession depends on</b></p><p><b>For the above four rounds of recession, according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of recession, it can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82).</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 'Soft Landing'</b>The backdrop is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and then the Federal Reserve did not have a big rate hike, and the highest policy interest rate was only about 9%. Inflation is limited, on the one hand, because it has not suffered from supply shocks, on the other hand, it is also related to the price control of the Nixon administration.</p><p></li><li><b>1980 'Soft Landing'</b>The background is that inflation peaked and fell, and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in time. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached an all-time high of 14.8%, and the monthly rate of federal funds once reached 17.6%. However, when the recession began, the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, the economy soon began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The main reason is that under the supply shock, the inflation rate is still rising during the recession, and then the policy interest rate has to follow the inflation and rise rapidly (even if the policy interest rate is not significantly higher than the inflation rate);</p><p></li><li><b>1981-82 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The background is that the Federal Reserve is eager to curb inflation, so it takes very radical rate hike measures (the Federal Funds rate once reached about 20%). Although the inflation rate soon began to decline, the policy interest rate continues to be significantly higher than the inflation rate, which delays the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>From this, we can conclude that the requirements of a \"soft landing\" are more demanding-first,</b>The inflationary pressure can't be too great, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time at the beginning of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Fed rate hike cannot be too aggressive and even needs to cut interest rates in time for a recession to arrive.<b>Finally,</b>If the government excessively intervenes in prices, or unfortunately, a new supply shock occurs, then a \"soft landing\" may be only temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, and a \"hard landing\" will be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues of asset prices</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, high inflation was the \"worst enemy\" of the American economy and policy, so the inflation situation became the bellwether of the capital market. In this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and monetary policy logic. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. In addition, the \"great stagflation\" has brought long-term pain to the economy and market, and then safe-haven assets such as the US dollar have performed positively for a long time.</b></p><p><b>4.1. US stocks: inflation is the worst enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the trend of U.S. stocks was dominated by inflation. Whenever the inflation rate turned downward, U.S. stocks immediately rebounded.</b>July 1970, December 1974 and March 1980 corresponded to three rounds of apex of CPI inflation in the United States, and were also the beginning of the rebound of the S&P 500 index. This may show that in the period of high inflation, the inflation trend is what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve may continue to tighten, and the US economy will be threatened by high inflation and high interest rates; As long as inflation falls, even if the economy is temporarily weak, the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery, and the tightening of the Federal Reserve is expected to relax, so the stock market will be included in the recovery expectation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In the mid-recession bottom out of U.S. stocks, the adjustment magnitude does not entirely depend on the degree of recession.</b>At the beginning of the four rounds of recession defined by NBER, U.S. stocks were all under pressure. However, before the recession was over, U.S. stocks often took the lead in rebounding due to the loosening of monetary policy expectations, the easing of inflationary pressure and the strengthening of market recovery expectations. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" is ahead of the \"market bottom\", and the \"market bottom\" is ahead of the \"economic bottom\".</b>Data-wise, the bottom of the S&P 500 all occurred during recessions.</p><p><b>However, the extent of the correction in U.S. stocks does not depend entirely on the extent of the recession:</b>In the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and in the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell by no more than 20%; Only in the 1973-75 \"hard landing\", the S&P 500 fell nearly 40%. From the perspective of rebound, after four rounds of recession and the adjustment of U.S. stocks, the rebound of U.S. stocks is relatively strong, and the rebound of the S&P 500 index from the trough exceeds 30%.</p><p><b>Perhaps the logic behind this is:</b>The market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic as a whole. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not so optimistic, the cost performance ratio of US stocks can still attract capital inflows due to the low \"base\" before. This means that, no matter the degree of recession, it is possible to get good returns as long as you find the bottom and moderately \"tilt forward\" to lay out U.S. stocks.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Fed is not the \"perpetual enemy\" of U.S. stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of U.S. stocks after 1970 and 1980, even if the U.S. CPI inflation rate was higher after 1980, the Federal Reserve's rate hike was more aggressive, and the degree of recession was not weak, the overall performance of U.S. stocks was significantly better than that in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amid volatility, while after 1980 the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. Especially compared with 1973-75 and 1981-82, both were \"hard landings\", but the latter U.S. stocks fell less and rebounded more. The biggest difference between the two periods is that,<b>The latter Fed tightened harder and may have played a more important role in \"creating\" a recession.</b>In the process of the Fed's aggressive rate hike, the inflation rate dropped significantly: on the one hand, it eased the inhibition of high inflation on economic growth; on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Fed, which in turn made the recovery expectation stronger and the risk appetite higher. Moreover, after 1980, \"Reaganomics\" entered the stage of history, and after the full and painful clearance of the market, American productivity rose rapidly. Therefore, US stocks rebounded stronger due to the \"two-wheel drive\" of the policy interest rate decline after controllable inflation and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of U.S. stocks, but the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, has finally become a \"friend\" of US stocks!</p><p><b>4.2. US Debt: \"Dancing\" with Monetary Policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the U.S. debt market experienced a long-term bear market, and high inflation and high interest rates jointly drove the US Treasury yields upward.</b>However, the volatility of 10-year U.S. bond interest rate is significantly smaller than that of CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the U.S. economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: before and after the four rounds of recession in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds fell in the first round, the second round fluctuated upward, the third round rose sharply, and the fourth round fluctuated strongly. This may reflect the evolution process of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, that is, the importance of inflation is constantly increasing, and the consideration of the economy is constantly weakening. Then<b>Over time, markets trade less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\".</b>It was not until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was below 5% and the GDP shrank year-on-year, that the market believed that the Federal Reserve could cut interest rates without distraction, and the US Treasury yields dropped significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of 10-year U.S. bond interest rates was more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 81, the CPI inflation rate in the United States showed a downward trend, but the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate rose rapidly, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the fluctuation trend of 10-year U.S. bond interest rate and policy interest rate is relatively in line, which reflects the effectiveness of monetary policy reform in Volcker era, that is, the driving force of the Federal Reserve on bond interest rate has been significantly improved.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate \"dances\" with the policy interest rate, the fluctuation range is even smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate was very similar to the absolute level and trend of Federal Funds rate. In the 1970s, when high inflation arrived and the Federal Reserve rate hike, although the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate would also rise, the increase was even smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced the market risk appetite, and U.S. debt has played a certain risk-off attribute; On the other hand, out of concern about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn depresses the medium and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of U.S. bonds is negative). When inflation dropped and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, although the 10-year US bond interest rate also dropped, the range was still limited, which made the US bond interest rate \"outperform\" the policy interest rate. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise of inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline of U.S. bond interest rate was insufficient, which once became a new problem faced by the Federal Reserve: the inflation rate in the United States has dropped to around 2%, but because the market inflation expectation has not dropped in time, the bond market interest rate has dropped slowly, hindering the economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker began to regard the bond market interest rate as the measure of inflation expectations, and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. The 10-year trend of U.S. bond interest rate was further in line with the policy interest rate.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US dollar: Multiple factors create a strong US dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the rate hike of the Federal Reserve, the rising demand for safe haven in the market, and the impact of non-American economies jointly created the strong US dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the rapid depreciation of the dollar exchange rate, which was not strongly correlated with the U.S. economic and currency cycle. From 1981 to 84, the exchange rate of the US dollar continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index once rose above the historical peak of 160 from about 85 in the second half of 1980; It wasn't until the Plaza Accord was signed in 1985 that the strong dollar ended.</p><p><b>How to make sense of a strong dollar during this period?</b>First of all, after 1980, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker strictly controlled the money supply, and the scarcity of the US dollar rose; Second, in 1981-82, the U.S. economy fell into recession due to the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. stock market experienced obvious adjustment. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attribute of the U.S. dollar; Third, in 1983-84, the U.S. economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery, with the Federal Reserve's policy rate and US Treasury yields remaining relatively high. During this period, the dollar exchange rate is still strengthening: on the one hand, the market's confidence in the Federal Reserve has increased; On the other hand, the spillover effect of the early Fed tightening on non-US economies appeared (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made US dollar assets very attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that,<b>During the Fed's aggressive rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields are trending upward.</b>But,<b>The reaction of the dollar rate lags behind that of US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate began to rise rapidly, while the upward trend in the US Dollar Index lagged by about three months; In June, 1984, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds began to fall due to the market's expectation of interest rate cuts, but the decline in the US Dollar Index lagged by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New Enlightenment for the Present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of multiple factors such as monetary and fiscal easing, slow action of the Federal Reserve, and supply shocks. But in contrast,<b>We tend to think that U.S. inflation won't get as out of control as it did then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the US government did not implement rough price control like the Nixon administration that year, and the balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, which reduced the risk of repeated inflation in the future;</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>At present, the risk of \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively low, on the one hand, it benefits from the medium-and long-term inflation expectation that is still relatively stable at present, and on the other hand, it benefits from the long-term weakening of trade union power in the United States;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>At present, the United States has a stronger ability to digest the \"oil crisis\". Especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010, the proportion of U.S. energy consumption in total private consumption has declined, and the United States has also changed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. Therefore, the transmission of oil price to the core inflation rate of the United States has declined. Therefore, even if the current year-on-year growth rate of energy sub-item of CPI in the United States is as high as 40%, reaching the level of two oil crises in 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is obviously lower than that at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has made mistakes in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy, and the lack of confidence in monetary policy in the market, were an important background for the repeated stagflation in the 1970s-1980s. In contrast,<b>The Fed is now more proactive. Even if it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (\"inflation temporary theory\"), there may still be room for redress for this mistake:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First of all,</b>In understanding and dealing with \"stagflation\", the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones\", and the monetary policy has already defined the goal of \"price stability\". Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is the premise of \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the top priority of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>After the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve has a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the birth of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), a higher efficiency of communication with the market, and a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Fed's tightening signal has significantly raised the nominal interest rate of U.S. bonds, and the agile response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. At present, the inflation expectation in the United States has not been \"unanchored\". The ten-year inflation expectation monitored by the Cleveland Fed model does not exceed 2.5%, far less than the level of 4-5% in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Fed is more independent today. Currently, inflation is the \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Fed together, and the Fed tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressure increases in the future and the president pressures the Fed, the Fed is expected to be more firm in defending its credibility. Just as Powell's Fed had four rate hike in 2018, defying then-President Trump's criticism.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. This round of economic recession in the United States is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s-1980s, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the recession came as expected. Compared to the current:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the CPI inflation rate in the United States reached as high as 9.1%, which not only exceeded the level that triggered the recession before, but also exceeded the level of the \"soft landing\" period of the U.S. economy in 1970;</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>At present, the Federal Reserve has shown great determination to curb inflation, or keep the policy interest rate at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for a long time, at the cost of economic recession (refer to our previous report \"The Fed's Credibility Defense\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker period in 1981-82, this Fed tightening might be strong enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>At present, the risk of repeated inflation in the future cannot be ruled out. If there is unfortunately a new supply shock in the future, or the actual tightening of the Federal Reserve is insufficient (for example, when the US economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future, the Federal Reserve stops tightening or even cuts interest rates prematurely), then the US inflation may still repeat, thus leading to a greater recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trend of this round of major assets may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) US stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment range may not be too deep, and the rebound or recession will be realized.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend is also strongly correlated with the performance of U.S. stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, with the rising CPI inflation rate in the United States, U.S. stocks ushered in a round of deep adjustment; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled down, and U.S. stocks rebounded in stages; Since late August, with the persistence of high inflation exceeding expectations, the Federal Reserve's policy orientation has become tougher, and U.S. stocks have paid more attention to monetary policy, staging a new round of \"tightening panic\".</p><p></li><li><b>The U.S. stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the period when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession in 1981-82.</b>In 1981-82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to fall, the tightening of the Federal Reserve caused a shock to the economy and the stock market. Similarly, the current Fed seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\", which is bound to ensure that inflation falls at the cost of recession. At present, inflation in the United States is still at a high level, the economy has not yet substantially declined, and the market's pricing of the recession is not sufficient. There may still be room for adjustment in the subsequent U.S. stocks. From historical experience, U.S. stocks may still fall in the early stage of the recession, and it is not until the monetary policy begins to relax in the middle and late stages of the recession that U.S. stocks ushered in a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Federal Reserve will not be the \"forever enemy\" of U.S. stocks. If the Federal Reserve successfully helps inflation fall, the adjustment range of U.S. stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"created\" the recession in 1981-92, the adjustment of U.S. stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom of early 1980. Although the Fed's vigorous fight against inflation brings \"short-term pain\", it can avoid the repeated \"long-term pain\" of inflation. Considering that this round of inflation is more optimistic than that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Fed's actions are not too passive, this round of adjustment of U.S. stocks may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) US debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession is realized. It is necessary to wait until the monetary policy clearly begins to relax.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor of the current 10-year U.S. bond interest rate is also monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s-1980s was that the bond market hovered between \"recession trading\" and \"tightening trading\". But bond markets are trading less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\" as the Fed becomes more determined to fight inflation. In July this year, due to the cooling of inflation expectations and the heating of recession expectations, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds dropped significantly. However, since late August, with the tougher policy orientation of the Federal Reserve, the market has paid more attention to tightening. Therefore, the interest rate of U.S. bonds has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has risen above 4%, exceeding the stage high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Fed also insists on tightening during the recession, then the interest rate of U.S. bonds in the early 10-year period of the recession may not fall soon.</b>Just as at the beginning of the US economic recession in 1981-82, even though the US CPI inflation rate has dropped significantly from its high point, it is still a long way from the 2% target, the monetary policy has not relaxed, and the 10-year US bond interest rate remains at a high level. We expect that even if the U.S. economy starts to decline in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade a recession prematurely.</p><p></li><li><b>A decline in the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds may require a substantial decline in the policy interest rate.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the U.S. debt bull market really started. And note that at that time, the starting point of the policy interest rate decline was ahead of the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate, and the decline was deeper. This means that after the monetary policy clearly begins to relax, the 10-year US bond interest rate may drop significantly.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) US dollar: \"Strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar exchange rate falls or US Treasury yields needs to fall</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Looking at the mid-cycle, the logic of the current \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>In 1980-84, the US Dollar Index stepped out of the \"big peak of history\". Even though the Federal Reserve cut interest rates during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. At present, the logic supporting the US dollar is very similar to that of the 1980s: the US economy has obvious advantages over non-American regions, and the Fed's tightening confidence is stronger than that of other developed economies. Looking back, even if the US economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession\", non-US economic and financial risks may not be eliminated (this can be seen from the fluctuations of European and Japanese bond and exchange rate markets this year), but the market's trust in US dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have weakened at present). Therefore, the the US Dollar Index volatility hub is expected to remain higher than pre-COVID levels for at least the next 1-2 years.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, the US Treasury yields or the \"leading indicator\" to judge the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate started the upward cycle earlier than the US Dollar Index; In 1984-85, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds fell before the US Dollar Index. In fact, the past market performance basically confirms the leadership of US Treasury yields over the US Dollar Index:<b>1-3 months after the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate peaked and fell, the US Dollar Index usually peaked and fell.</b>As mentioned earlier, the opening of this round of U.S. debt bull market may have to wait until the recession is realized and the monetary policy loosens. After that, the signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the U.S. economy is less than expected.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for the recovery of the service industry in the United States, under the environment of high inflation and high interest rates, residents' consumption confidence is insufficient or the actual consumption is suppressed, which in turn makes the economic growth weaker than the benchmark expectation; As the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cool down, the U.S. job market may cool at a faster pace than expected.</i></p><p><b><i>2. A new supply shock occurs.</i></b><i>If a new supply shock occurs in the future, and the prices of international energy, food and other commodities are raised again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may rise significantly, and the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, and the market sentiment will turn pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Fed's tightening is insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Fed's tightening is insufficient and inflation repeats, the cost of the Fed's subsequent inflation control will be greater; If the Fed's tightening is significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may rise and may ultimately threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-American regions exceed expectations.</i></b><i>At present, the economic and financial risks of large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If a large economic and financial risk event occurs in the future, the U.S. economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>America's \"Great Stagflation\" Rethinks! On the Enlightenment of Current Asset Price</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAmerica's \"Great Stagflation\" Rethinks! On the Enlightenment of Current Asset Price\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/70\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/86f6d9605fc344e28cd4247a93dcdc2b);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">钟正生经济分析 </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2022-10-02 09:35</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body><b>First, the complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s are extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, crude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively quench inflation; Furthermore, the supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the chronically overshooting inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations and triggered a wage-price spiral that has deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the \"fault\" and \"merit\" of the Federal Reserve.</b>In 1970-1979, the Fed's tightening was not firm enough for many reasons: first, the Fed once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Second, the Fed's primary goal at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, Fed decisions are also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its duty, strengthened rate hike and controlled money supply. Since then, the Fed has worked to stabilize inflation expectations for a longer period of time, reshaping the Fed's credibility.</p><p><b>Third, \"soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States experienced four rounds of economic recession, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82), which were the result of a combination of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh: first, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time in the early stage of recession; Secondly, the Fed's rate hike can't be too aggressive, and it even needs to cut interest rates in time when the recession comes; Finally, if a new supply shock occurs, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>4. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s-1980s, inflation became the bellwether of capital markets. The CPI inflation rate in the United States peaked in three stages, and U.S. stocks bottomed out in stages. However, in this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and monetary policy logic. Over time, the U.S. debt market has traded less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\". In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. After the \"Great Stagflation\" ended, safe-haven assets such as the US dollar still performed positively for a long time.</p><p><b>Fifth, new enlightenment to the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although this round of Fed has also \"made mistakes\", it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation; Third, this round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of \"hard landing\"; Fourth, the price trend of this round of major assets may be strongly similar to that of the 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>US stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment range may not be too deep, and the rebound or recession will be realized.<b>2）</b>US debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession is realized. It is necessary to wait until the monetary policy clearly begins to relax.<b>3）</b>US dollar: \"Strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar may need to fall back in US Treasury yields.</p><p><i>Risk: The US economy is weaker than expected, new supply shocks appear, and non-US financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the CPI inflation rate in the United States has once risen above 9%, the real GDP has shrunk quarter-on-quarter for two consecutive quarters, the (quasi) stagflation characteristics of the economy have become more distinct, and the capital market has also experienced large fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has constantly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current economic environment in the United States is very similar to that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve will also fully learn from the coping experience at that time, and do something but not do something, in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation\".</p><p>What is the current inflationary pressure in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the U.S. economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in the \"spring\"? In this report, with questions about the present, we revisit the inflation, monetary policy, economic growth and asset price performance during the \"Great Stagflation\" period of the United States in 1970s and 1980s, and try to understand the logic and laws, so as to enlighten us to judge the trend of the United States economy, monetary policy and market in the future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s are extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, crude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively quench inflation; Furthermore, the supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the chronically overshooting inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations and triggered a wage-price spiral that has deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a high inflation crisis, and the CPI inflation rate was generally above 5%, with a peak of 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States has risen rapidly at a rate of more than 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI broke 5% year-on-year, which began a 13-year era of \"high inflation\". From 1969 to 1982, the year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States showed three peaks, with the peaks in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%) and March 1980 (14.8%) respectively. In February 1982, CPI fell back below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1965-70, blind fiscal and monetary expansion fostered higher inflation.</b>With the economic reconstruction coming to an end after World War II and the rise of European and Asian economies, the economic growth momentum of the United States has weakened, but the blind stimulation at the policy level has led to obvious overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States continued to be higher than the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of the potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of U.S. economic growth at that time were stimulated by policies. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the real unemployment rate basically remained within 4%. At the time, the role of fiscal stimulus was stronger than that of currency. Federal expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the United States increased by 3.2 percentage points from 1966-68, and the deficit rate expanded from 0.2 percent in 1965 to 2.8 percent in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance. In June, then-President Johnson signed the Revenue Control Act of 1968, which supplemented fiscal revenue by raising taxes. In August of the same year, the Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" to hedge the impact of tax increases, adding fire to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1971-74, brutal price controls turned \"short pain\" into \"long pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. However, in practice, the scope of price control continued to expand, and it was not until 1974 that the US government completely removed its intervention in prices. During this period, except in special circumstances, all price increases of goods and services need to be approved by the government. In mid-1972, the CPI inflation rate in the United States fell back below 3%. This time price control, seen as a special case of full-scale peacetime government intervention in prices in American economic history, is also considered a failed attempt. This is because the price limit measures not only curb the price rise, but also seriously dampen the enthusiasm of production enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of social commodities, which laid the groundwork for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the \"Watergate Scandal\" and the new President Carter came to power, and the price control measures gradually lapsed. Slightly comically, both the Nixon and Carter administrations tried to control prices through verbal \"exhortation\". For example, when Carter first came to power, he encouraged people to buy \"bargains\": \"Be daring to show off to others, pick out your own bargains, and be proud of it\". These admonitions are almost futile for controlling prices. The CPI inflation rate in the United States has broken 5% again in April 1973, and since then has risen all the way to a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>One food crisis and two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on U.S. prices.</b>In 1973, the grain of the former Soviet Union failed due to bad weather, and then entered the international market to buy grain in large quantities, which triggered the worst grain crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of food CPI in the United States once rose above 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: the Saudi-led OPEC member states announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of crude oil in the World Bank jumped from $2.7/barrel in September 1973 to $13/barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From early 1979 to early 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, followed by the \"Iran-Iraq War\" in Iran and Iraq, which led to a sharp decline in global oil production. World Bank international oil prices rose from less than $15/barrel in December 1978 to more than $40/barrel in November 1979. In March, 1980, the U.S. energy CPI reached a peak of 47.1% year-on-year, and the U.S. CPI immediately reached a peak of 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1970-80, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations got out of control, and with the help of trade union forces, the \"wage-price spiral\" gradually took shape.</b>After the CPI inflation rate has been higher than 2% or even higher than 5% for many years in a row, American residents have lost their original confidence in prices, and their inflation expectations have risen. At that time, both the Federal Reserve and the market had limited awareness and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely cited University of Michigan survey and Cleveland Fed model are expected to be born only around 1980. The earliest tool to monitor inflation expectations in The United States was The Livingston Survey, born in 1946, which summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banking and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually risen since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, inflation expectations have also risen sharply with the headline inflation rate. The reverse impact of inflation expectation on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: labor demands a wage increase, and then residents' spending power and the cost pressure of enterprises rise, which at the same time contributes to the price increase, that is, the formation of a \"wage-price spiral\".<b>In particular, in the 1970s, the power of trade unions in the United States was huge, and the transmission of wage demands was smooth:</b>According to the data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, union members in the United States accounted for nearly 30% of the total social employees, and there were 200-400 strikes of more than 1,000 people every year (this number has been below 30 every year since 2000). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the CPI inflation rate in the United States dropped to about 5-7%, but the average hourly wage of non-agricultural and non-managers in the United States increased by 6-8% year-on-year, which was continuously higher than the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of rising wages prevented a further retreat in inflation and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1970-79, the Fed's policy response was relatively negative, continuing to \"lag behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, the policy interest rate and inflation trend in the United States showed a strong synchronization, which reflected that the Federal Reserve was \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a long time. In May 1969, the third month after the inflation rate broke 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate kept rising for about half a year before it began to fall back. In the second half of 1973, when the inflation rate in the United States was still rising, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates under economic pressure, and then the inflation rate accelerated. In 1978, the policy interest rate in the United States was basically the same as the inflation rate, and kept rising step by step until December 1978, when the monthly rate of federal funds rose above 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate, but soon the policy interest rate began to lag behind the inflation rate again. Later, when the policy interest rate in the United States was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation dropped significantly, and the Federal Reserve took the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker raised interest rates sharply to fight inflation; In mid-1981, the U.S. policy interest rate reached a peak of more than 19%, and in October of the same year, the CPI dropped month-on-month and year-on-year at the same time; Since then, the inflation rate of Federal Funds rate has continued to be 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI, and the inflation rate has continued to fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The \"fault\" and \"merit\" of the Federal Reserve</b></p><p><b>In 1970-1979, the Fed was not firm enough in tightening, including both a lack of awareness of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy and a lack of independence of monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its duty, strengthened rate hike and controlled money supply. Since then, the Fed has been working to stabilize inflation expectations for a longer period of time, reshaping the Fed's credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1. Reasons for the Fed's hesitation</b></p><p><b>The Fed continued to \"fall behind the curve\" in 1970-1979 for a number of reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Fed once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\".</b>At that time, the Federal Reserve was divided on the causes of high inflation, and tended to think that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, and then monetary policy chose to respond negatively. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve led by Burns believed that union power triggered cost-driven inflation, and then advocated \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. It also contributed to the wage and price freeze that was later imposed by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns also argued that \"improper fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\".</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated monetary policy logic, and the Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation). Therefore, the Fed's primary goal of monetary policy is to achieve \"full employment\", hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy tilts more towards the job market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred at the same time, the Fed once thought that inflation would not continue to deteriorate. For example, the 1978-79 Miller Fed argued that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above the full employment level (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, Fed decisions are also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then president and lacked independence, and vacillated in balancing the relationship between inflation and growth. In hindsight, the Fed's tolerance of inflation in the 1970s may be exactly what the rulers wanted to see: on the one hand, the rulers didn't want the Fed to undermine economic growth and affect votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also regarded as a hidden tax means, because the increase of nominal wages increases the progressiveness of the whole tax system, resulting in a sharp increase in fiscal revenue. The data shows that the proportion of personal income tax in GDP in the United States increased significantly during the high inflation periods of 1969-70, 1974 and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2. The exploits of the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the idea of \"monetary school\", took curbing inflation as its duty, and firmly rate hike and controlled the money supply. Although it \"created\" the economic recession, it finally defeated inflation.</b>In August, 1979, Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the \"monetary school\" view represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve led by him made the core position of monetary policy for price stability more clear, and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy goal, and then made a substantial rate hike, making the Federal Funds rate higher than the CPI inflation rate, so as to achieve the goal of controlling money supply. In March 1980, Volcker carried out an ill-advised but short-lived credit control experiment (the \"Special Credit Restriction Scheme\") to slow down the rate hike, but then resumed monetary tightening, which eventually pushed Federal Funds rate to a peak of more than 20% in mid-1981. The sharp rate hike, while bringing about a recession, ultimately helped inflation fall back.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In addition, in the Volcker and Greenspan era, the Fed established a new \"nominal anchor\" to stabilize inflation expectations and reshape the Fed's credibility, which is also an important background for the return of US prices to long-term stability in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after the \"Great Stagflation\", the original expectation of price stability suffered serious damage. Even in the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve defined its money supply target and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy was still questioned. It is not clear to the public whether the Fed can maintain its focus on inflation for the long term and has the ability to influence price movements in the medium and long term. Therefore, Volcker and his next Federal Reserve President Greenspan are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and finally re-establishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complicated and long process: Volcker's experience of defeating inflation is a good starting point, and then the Fed shifts from money supply targeting to \"implicit inflation targeting\".</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve pegs on the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap\" at the same time. In fact, it sets the policy interest rate through the Taylor Rule, pursues a stable medium-and long-term inflation target, and achieves stable economic growth. In terms of inflation expectation management, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, and at the same time strengthens communication with the capital market, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The post-Volcker monetary policy framework achieved long-term results in price stability, which led to the later era of Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States experienced four rounds of economic recession, which was the result of a combination of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct dampening effect on consumption and drives the Federal Reserve to rate hike and further curb investment. Therefore, the degree of recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh.</b></p><p><b>3.1. Three drivers of economic recession</b></p><p><b>According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four rounds of recession in the 1970s and 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>U.S. real GDP fell from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970 year over year, but the economy barely shrank. The U.S. unemployment rate, on the other hand, climbed significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a stage high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States declined from 5.6% in 1973 year-on-year, and it has shrunk year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest quarter-on-quarter shrinkage of 2.3%. The U.S. unemployment rate has been above 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a phase low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, and has since declined slowly.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>Real GDP in the United States shrank sharply by 8% in the second quarter of 1980, but only 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 6.3 percent to a peak of 7.8 percent. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy began to recover immediately, with GDP rising sharply by 7.7% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter, and the unemployment rate began to fall in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months)</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has shrunk year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest shrinkage of 2.6%. The unemployment rate in the United States began to recover significantly from a period low of 7.2% in August 1981, broke 8% in November of the same year, reached a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly declined, only to fall below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the recession drivers: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflation trends at that time, the two show a very close correlation:<b>The nodes of the U.S. economic recession all correspond to the time when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, the peak of CPI inflation in 1970 coincided with the beginning of the unemployment rebound and economic recession; In 1973-75, this round of unemployment rebound and the time when the economy was recognized as a recession were all after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%; In early 1980, when the CPI inflation rate hit an extremely high level of over 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If inflation is still rising when the recession occurs, the U.S. economy continues to downward; Only after inflation retreated did the U.S. economy begin to recover.</b>For example, in late 1970, the U.S. economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell back below 5%; In 1975, when the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the GDP growth rate of the United States turned positive from the previous month, and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared with the policy interest rate, the negative correlation between the inflation rate in the United States and the growth rate of private consumption is more obvious. Especially in the 1980s, when the policy interest rate jumped sharply, the inflation rate had fallen early, and private consumption began to pick up at that time, indicating that the easing of inflation has obviously helped the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Recession driver number two: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the cooling effect of the Fed's rate hike on the economy at that time was obvious:<b>When the US economy is overheating, the cooling effect of rate hike on the economy can be described as immediate:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the PMI of U.S. manufacturing exceeded 60, and the rate hike of the Federal Reserve rapidly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>While the U.S. economy itself was in a downturn or even a recession, rate hike deepened the magnitude of the economic contraction:</b>For example, in mid-1974, after the policy interest rate reached its peak, the downturn of the US economy accelerated, and the US GDP shrank sharply by 3.7% in the third quarter; From March to April 1980, after the monthly rate of federal funds reached a stage high of more than 17%, the U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% in the second quarter of the same year.<b>On the contrary, interest rate cuts can help the economy recover:</b>In December 1970, when policy interest rates fell below inflation, the U.S. economy was immediately in a state of recovery; The U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975 when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and brought the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below inflation in early 1975.<b>However, premature and premature rate cuts when inflation is not effectively controlled could end in \"inflation repeats + higher rate hike\", which could lead to a greater recession or delay a recovery that should have started earlier:</b>At the beginning of 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy continued, the U.S. economy still entered a recession; In May 1980, the monthly rate of federal funds had dropped to about 11% (supplemented by credit control), and the US economy temporarily left the recession zone in August. However, since then, inflation repeatedly forced the Federal Reserve to choose more rate hike, and in 1981, the US economy fell into a new round of deeper recession.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared with inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rate and private investment (lagging by 1 year) is more pronounced. In the second half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly; In 1981, when the Federal Reserve renewed its sharp rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation also declined significantly during this period, indicating that private investment is more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of recession: supply shock.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which weighed on U.S. growth in many ways, triggered recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks have raised CPI inflation, and rising consumer prices have dampened aggregate demand. Especially,<b>Supply shocks have triggered higher costs for energy consumption and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of consumption of energy goods and services in private consumption in the United States rose from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, and it didn't drop significantly until after 1985.<b>Second, supply shocks have increased the cost of U.S. oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10/barrel, and net U.S. oil imports in 1974 were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that the increase in oil prices will drag down the US GDP by about 21.9 billion dollars by increasing the net import cost, dragging down the nominal growth rate of GDP by 1.4 percentage points; Similarly, rising net oil import costs after the second oil crisis dragged down nominal U.S. GDP growth by 2.8 percentage points in 1979.<b>Third, supply shocks triggered a shortage of raw materials, weakening U.S. industrial production capacity.</b>After the two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the total industrial production index of the United States declined sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks, it can be found that at the time of the first shock, the inflation rate of CPI in the United States was lower, while the inflation rate of PPI was higher, and then the impact of industrial production was deeper, which also reflected that the impact of supply shock on economic output was more mainly manifested in the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2. What the degree of recession depends on</b></p><p><b>For the above four rounds of recession, according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of recession, it can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82).</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 'Soft Landing'</b>The backdrop is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and then the Federal Reserve did not have a big rate hike, and the highest policy interest rate was only about 9%. Inflation is limited, on the one hand, because it has not suffered from supply shocks, on the other hand, it is also related to the price control of the Nixon administration.</p><p></li><li><b>1980 'Soft Landing'</b>The background is that inflation peaked and fell, and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in time. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached an all-time high of 14.8%, and the monthly rate of federal funds once reached 17.6%. However, when the recession began, the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, the economy soon began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The main reason is that under the supply shock, the inflation rate is still rising during the recession, and then the policy interest rate has to follow the inflation and rise rapidly (even if the policy interest rate is not significantly higher than the inflation rate);</p><p></li><li><b>1981-82 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The background is that the Federal Reserve is eager to curb inflation, so it takes very radical rate hike measures (the Federal Funds rate once reached about 20%). Although the inflation rate soon began to decline, the policy interest rate continues to be significantly higher than the inflation rate, which delays the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>From this, we can conclude that the requirements of a \"soft landing\" are more demanding-first,</b>The inflationary pressure can't be too great, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time at the beginning of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Fed rate hike cannot be too aggressive and even needs to cut interest rates in time for a recession to arrive.<b>Finally,</b>If the government excessively intervenes in prices, or unfortunately, a new supply shock occurs, then a \"soft landing\" may be only temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, and a \"hard landing\" will be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues of asset prices</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, high inflation was the \"worst enemy\" of the American economy and policy, so the inflation situation became the bellwether of the capital market. In this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and monetary policy logic. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. In addition, the \"great stagflation\" has brought long-term pain to the economy and market, and then safe-haven assets such as the US dollar have performed positively for a long time.</b></p><p><b>4.1. US stocks: inflation is the worst enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the trend of U.S. stocks was dominated by inflation. Whenever the inflation rate turned downward, U.S. stocks immediately rebounded.</b>July 1970, December 1974 and March 1980 corresponded to three rounds of apex of CPI inflation in the United States, and were also the beginning of the rebound of the S&P 500 index. This may show that in the period of high inflation, the inflation trend is what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve may continue to tighten, and the US economy will be threatened by high inflation and high interest rates; As long as inflation falls, even if the economy is temporarily weak, the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery, and the tightening of the Federal Reserve is expected to relax, so the stock market will be included in the recovery expectation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In the mid-recession bottom out of U.S. stocks, the adjustment magnitude does not entirely depend on the degree of recession.</b>At the beginning of the four rounds of recession defined by NBER, U.S. stocks were all under pressure. However, before the recession was over, U.S. stocks often took the lead in rebounding due to the loosening of monetary policy expectations, the easing of inflationary pressure and the strengthening of market recovery expectations. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" is ahead of the \"market bottom\", and the \"market bottom\" is ahead of the \"economic bottom\".</b>Data-wise, the bottom of the S&P 500 all occurred during recessions.</p><p><b>However, the extent of the correction in U.S. stocks does not depend entirely on the extent of the recession:</b>In the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and in the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell by no more than 20%; Only in the 1973-75 \"hard landing\", the S&P 500 fell nearly 40%. From the perspective of rebound, after four rounds of recession and the adjustment of U.S. stocks, the rebound of U.S. stocks is relatively strong, and the rebound of the S&P 500 index from the trough exceeds 30%.</p><p><b>Perhaps the logic behind this is:</b>The market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic as a whole. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not so optimistic, the cost performance ratio of US stocks can still attract capital inflows due to the low \"base\" before. This means that, no matter the degree of recession, it is possible to get good returns as long as you find the bottom and moderately \"tilt forward\" to lay out U.S. stocks.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Fed is not the \"perpetual enemy\" of U.S. stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of U.S. stocks after 1970 and 1980, even if the U.S. CPI inflation rate was higher after 1980, the Federal Reserve's rate hike was more aggressive, and the degree of recession was not weak, the overall performance of U.S. stocks was significantly better than that in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amid volatility, while after 1980 the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. Especially compared with 1973-75 and 1981-82, both were \"hard landings\", but the latter U.S. stocks fell less and rebounded more. The biggest difference between the two periods is that,<b>The latter Fed tightened harder and may have played a more important role in \"creating\" a recession.</b>In the process of the Fed's aggressive rate hike, the inflation rate dropped significantly: on the one hand, it eased the inhibition of high inflation on economic growth; on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Fed, which in turn made the recovery expectation stronger and the risk appetite higher. Moreover, after 1980, \"Reaganomics\" entered the stage of history, and after the full and painful clearance of the market, American productivity rose rapidly. Therefore, US stocks rebounded stronger due to the \"two-wheel drive\" of the policy interest rate decline after controllable inflation and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of U.S. stocks, but the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, has finally become a \"friend\" of US stocks!</p><p><b>4.2. US Debt: \"Dancing\" with Monetary Policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the U.S. debt market experienced a long-term bear market, and high inflation and high interest rates jointly drove the US Treasury yields upward.</b>However, the volatility of 10-year U.S. bond interest rate is significantly smaller than that of CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the U.S. economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: before and after the four rounds of recession in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds fell in the first round, the second round fluctuated upward, the third round rose sharply, and the fourth round fluctuated strongly. This may reflect the evolution process of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, that is, the importance of inflation is constantly increasing, and the consideration of the economy is constantly weakening. Then<b>Over time, markets trade less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\".</b>It was not until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was below 5% and the GDP shrank year-on-year, that the market believed that the Federal Reserve could cut interest rates without distraction, and the US Treasury yields dropped significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of 10-year U.S. bond interest rates was more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 81, the CPI inflation rate in the United States showed a downward trend, but the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate rose rapidly, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the fluctuation trend of 10-year U.S. bond interest rate and policy interest rate is relatively in line, which reflects the effectiveness of monetary policy reform in Volcker era, that is, the driving force of the Federal Reserve on bond interest rate has been significantly improved.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate \"dances\" with the policy interest rate, the fluctuation range is even smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate was very similar to the absolute level and trend of Federal Funds rate. In the 1970s, when high inflation arrived and the Federal Reserve rate hike, although the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate would also rise, the increase was even smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced the market risk appetite, and U.S. debt has played a certain risk-off attribute; On the other hand, out of concern about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn depresses the medium and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of U.S. bonds is negative). When inflation dropped and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, although the 10-year US bond interest rate also dropped, the range was still limited, which made the US bond interest rate \"outperform\" the policy interest rate. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise of inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline of U.S. bond interest rate was insufficient, which once became a new problem faced by the Federal Reserve: the inflation rate in the United States has dropped to around 2%, but because the market inflation expectation has not dropped in time, the bond market interest rate has dropped slowly, hindering the economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker began to regard the bond market interest rate as the measure of inflation expectations, and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. The 10-year trend of U.S. bond interest rate was further in line with the policy interest rate.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US dollar: Multiple factors create a strong US dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the rate hike of the Federal Reserve, the rising demand for safe haven in the market, and the impact of non-American economies jointly created the strong US dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the rapid depreciation of the dollar exchange rate, which was not strongly correlated with the U.S. economic and currency cycle. From 1981 to 84, the exchange rate of the US dollar continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index once rose above the historical peak of 160 from about 85 in the second half of 1980; It wasn't until the Plaza Accord was signed in 1985 that the strong dollar ended.</p><p><b>How to make sense of a strong dollar during this period?</b>First of all, after 1980, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker strictly controlled the money supply, and the scarcity of the US dollar rose; Second, in 1981-82, the U.S. economy fell into recession due to the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. stock market experienced obvious adjustment. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attribute of the U.S. dollar; Third, in 1983-84, the U.S. economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery, with the Federal Reserve's policy rate and US Treasury yields remaining relatively high. During this period, the dollar exchange rate is still strengthening: on the one hand, the market's confidence in the Federal Reserve has increased; On the other hand, the spillover effect of the early Fed tightening on non-US economies appeared (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made US dollar assets very attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that,<b>During the Fed's aggressive rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields are trending upward.</b>But,<b>The reaction of the dollar rate lags behind that of US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate began to rise rapidly, while the upward trend in the US Dollar Index lagged by about three months; In June, 1984, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds began to fall due to the market's expectation of interest rate cuts, but the decline in the US Dollar Index lagged by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New Enlightenment for the Present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of multiple factors such as monetary and fiscal easing, slow action of the Federal Reserve, and supply shocks. But in contrast,<b>We tend to think that U.S. inflation won't get as out of control as it did then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the US government did not implement rough price control like the Nixon administration that year, and the balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, which reduced the risk of repeated inflation in the future;</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>At present, the risk of \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively low, on the one hand, it benefits from the medium-and long-term inflation expectation that is still relatively stable at present, and on the other hand, it benefits from the long-term weakening of trade union power in the United States;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>At present, the United States has a stronger ability to digest the \"oil crisis\". Especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010, the proportion of U.S. energy consumption in total private consumption has declined, and the United States has also changed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. Therefore, the transmission of oil price to the core inflation rate of the United States has declined. Therefore, even if the current year-on-year growth rate of energy sub-item of CPI in the United States is as high as 40%, reaching the level of two oil crises in 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is obviously lower than that at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has made mistakes in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy, and the lack of confidence in monetary policy in the market, were an important background for the repeated stagflation in the 1970s-1980s. In contrast,<b>The Fed is now more proactive. Even if it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (\"inflation temporary theory\"), there may still be room for redress for this mistake:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First of all,</b>In understanding and dealing with \"stagflation\", the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones\", and the monetary policy has already defined the goal of \"price stability\". Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is the premise of \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the top priority of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>After the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve has a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the birth of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), a higher efficiency of communication with the market, and a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Fed's tightening signal has significantly raised the nominal interest rate of U.S. bonds, and the agile response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. At present, the inflation expectation in the United States has not been \"unanchored\". The ten-year inflation expectation monitored by the Cleveland Fed model does not exceed 2.5%, far less than the level of 4-5% in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Fed is more independent today. Currently, inflation is the \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Fed together, and the Fed tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressure increases in the future and the president pressures the Fed, the Fed is expected to be more firm in defending its credibility. Just as Powell's Fed had four rate hike in 2018, defying then-President Trump's criticism.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. This round of economic recession in the United States is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s-1980s, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the recession came as expected. Compared to the current:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the CPI inflation rate in the United States reached as high as 9.1%, which not only exceeded the level that triggered the recession before, but also exceeded the level of the \"soft landing\" period of the U.S. economy in 1970;</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>At present, the Federal Reserve has shown great determination to curb inflation, or keep the policy interest rate at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for a long time, at the cost of economic recession (refer to our previous report \"The Fed's Credibility Defense\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker period in 1981-82, this Fed tightening might be strong enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>At present, the risk of repeated inflation in the future cannot be ruled out. If there is unfortunately a new supply shock in the future, or the actual tightening of the Federal Reserve is insufficient (for example, when the US economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future, the Federal Reserve stops tightening or even cuts interest rates prematurely), then the US inflation may still repeat, thus leading to a greater recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trend of this round of major assets may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) US stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment range may not be too deep, and the rebound or recession will be realized.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend is also strongly correlated with the performance of U.S. stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, with the rising CPI inflation rate in the United States, U.S. stocks ushered in a round of deep adjustment; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled down, and U.S. stocks rebounded in stages; Since late August, with the persistence of high inflation exceeding expectations, the Federal Reserve's policy orientation has become tougher, and U.S. stocks have paid more attention to monetary policy, staging a new round of \"tightening panic\".</p><p></li><li><b>The U.S. stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the period when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession in 1981-82.</b>In 1981-82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to fall, the tightening of the Federal Reserve caused a shock to the economy and the stock market. Similarly, the current Fed seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\", which is bound to ensure that inflation falls at the cost of recession. At present, inflation in the United States is still at a high level, the economy has not yet substantially declined, and the market's pricing of the recession is not sufficient. There may still be room for adjustment in the subsequent U.S. stocks. From historical experience, U.S. stocks may still fall in the early stage of the recession, and it is not until the monetary policy begins to relax in the middle and late stages of the recession that U.S. stocks ushered in a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Federal Reserve will not be the \"forever enemy\" of U.S. stocks. If the Federal Reserve successfully helps inflation fall, the adjustment range of U.S. stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"created\" the recession in 1981-92, the adjustment of U.S. stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom of early 1980. Although the Fed's vigorous fight against inflation brings \"short-term pain\", it can avoid the repeated \"long-term pain\" of inflation. Considering that this round of inflation is more optimistic than that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Fed's actions are not too passive, this round of adjustment of U.S. stocks may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) US debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession is realized. It is necessary to wait until the monetary policy clearly begins to relax.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor of the current 10-year U.S. bond interest rate is also monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s-1980s was that the bond market hovered between \"recession trading\" and \"tightening trading\". But bond markets are trading less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\" as the Fed becomes more determined to fight inflation. In July this year, due to the cooling of inflation expectations and the heating of recession expectations, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds dropped significantly. However, since late August, with the tougher policy orientation of the Federal Reserve, the market has paid more attention to tightening. Therefore, the interest rate of U.S. bonds has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has risen above 4%, exceeding the stage high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Fed also insists on tightening during the recession, then the interest rate of U.S. bonds in the early 10-year period of the recession may not fall soon.</b>Just as at the beginning of the US economic recession in 1981-82, even though the US CPI inflation rate has dropped significantly from its high point, it is still a long way from the 2% target, the monetary policy has not relaxed, and the 10-year US bond interest rate remains at a high level. We expect that even if the U.S. economy starts to decline in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade a recession prematurely.</p><p></li><li><b>A decline in the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds may require a substantial decline in the policy interest rate.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the U.S. debt bull market really started. And note that at that time, the starting point of the policy interest rate decline was ahead of the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate, and the decline was deeper. This means that after the monetary policy clearly begins to relax, the 10-year US bond interest rate may drop significantly.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) US dollar: \"Strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar exchange rate falls or US Treasury yields needs to fall</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Looking at the mid-cycle, the logic of the current \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>In 1980-84, the US Dollar Index stepped out of the \"big peak of history\". Even though the Federal Reserve cut interest rates during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. At present, the logic supporting the US dollar is very similar to that of the 1980s: the US economy has obvious advantages over non-American regions, and the Fed's tightening confidence is stronger than that of other developed economies. Looking back, even if the US economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession\", non-US economic and financial risks may not be eliminated (this can be seen from the fluctuations of European and Japanese bond and exchange rate markets this year), but the market's trust in US dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have weakened at present). Therefore, the the US Dollar Index volatility hub is expected to remain higher than pre-COVID levels for at least the next 1-2 years.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, the US Treasury yields or the \"leading indicator\" to judge the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate started the upward cycle earlier than the US Dollar Index; In 1984-85, the interest rate of 10-year U.S. bonds fell before the US Dollar Index. In fact, the past market performance basically confirms the leadership of US Treasury yields over the US Dollar Index:<b>1-3 months after the 10-year U.S. bond interest rate peaked and fell, the US Dollar Index usually peaked and fell.</b>As mentioned earlier, the opening of this round of U.S. debt bull market may have to wait until the recession is realized and the monetary policy loosens. After that, the signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the U.S. economy is less than expected.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for the recovery of the service industry in the United States, under the environment of high inflation and high interest rates, residents' consumption confidence is insufficient or the actual consumption is suppressed, which in turn makes the economic growth weaker than the benchmark expectation; As the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cool down, the U.S. job market may cool at a faster pace than expected.</i></p><p><b><i>2. A new supply shock occurs.</i></b><i>If a new supply shock occurs in the future, and the prices of international energy, food and other commodities are raised again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may rise significantly, and the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, and the market sentiment will turn pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Fed's tightening is insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Fed's tightening is insufficient and inflation repeats, the cost of the Fed's subsequent inflation control will be greater; If the Fed's tightening is significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may rise and may ultimately threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-American regions exceed expectations.</i></b><i>At present, the economic and financial risks of large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If a large economic and financial risk event occurs in the future, the U.S. economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/4f6ec6e99c0c8b9feb7f296b78c65a54","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index"},"source_url":"","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1100486117","content_text":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。二、美联储的“过”与“功”。1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因是多方面的：首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”；其次，当时美联储的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”；最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。三、“软着陆”与“硬着陆”。1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年），这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。但实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的：首先，CPI通胀率或需在衰退初期及时回落；其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息；最后，若发生新的供给冲击，“硬着陆”可能更难避免。四、资产价格的线索。1970-80年代，通胀成为资本市场的风向标。美国CPI通胀率三次阶段性触顶，美股皆阶段性触底。但在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。随时间推移，美债市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。“大滞胀”结束后，美元等避险资产仍在较长时间里表现积极。五、对当下的新启示。第一，本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限；第二，本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动；第三，本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险；第四，本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性：1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元回落或需美债利率回落。风险提示：美国经济弱于预期，出现新的供给冲击，非美金融风险上升等。2022年以来，美国CPI通胀率一度升破9%，实际GDP连续两个季度环比萎缩，经济的（类）滞胀特征更加鲜明，资本市场也经历了大幅波动。8月下旬杰克逊霍尔会议以来，美联储在各类场合不断提到“历史经验”，说明当前美国经济环境与1970-80年代极为相似，而美联储也将充分借鉴当时的应对经验，有所为而有所不为，以期帮助美国战胜“滞胀”。当前美国通胀压力几何？货币政策会如何应对？美国经济是否还能实现“软着陆”？资本市场何时迎来“春天”？在本篇报告中，我们带着对当下的疑问，重温1970-80年代美国“大滞胀”时期的通胀、货币政策、经济增长和资产价格表现，并尝试理解其中的逻辑与规律，以期对判断未来一段时间美国经济、货币政策和市场走向有所启发。01、高通胀的复杂性1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。1969-1982年，美国陷入高通胀危机，CPI通胀率普遍高于5%，最高曾达到14.8%。美国CPI同比增速自1968年开始便以3%以上的速度较快上升，1969年3月CPI同比破5%，从此开始了长达13年的“高通胀”时代。在1969-1982年里，美国CPI同比增速走势出现三轮波峰，峰值分别在1970年1月（6.2%）、1974年12月（12.3%）和1980年3月（14.8%）。1982年2月CPI同比回落至5%以下。1965-70年，财政和货币盲目扩张，孕育通胀走高。随着二战后经济重建告一段落，加上欧洲与亚洲经济的兴起，美国经济增长动能趋弱，但政策层面盲目刺激，导致经济明显过热。1965-1970年，美国实际GDP增速持续高于潜在增速水平，且产出缺口（实际GDP与潜在GDP差值）占潜在GDP的比重高达3-6%。换言之，当时美国经济增速中有3-6个百分点都是政策刺激出来的。这一时期，美国自然失业率在5.6-5.9%，但实际失业率基本保持在4%以内。在当时，财政刺激的角色强于货币。美国联邦财政支出占GDP比重由在1966-68年期间上升了3.2个百分点，赤字率由1965年的0.2%扩大至1968年的2.8%。1968年，美国政府开始担心财政平衡问题，时任总统约翰逊6月签署了“1968收支控制法”，通过加税补充财政收入。而美联储于同年8月“技术性降息”以对冲加税的影响，为经济过热添火助力。1971-74年，粗暴的价格管制将“短痛”变为“长痛”。1971年8月，尼克松政府实行了为时90天的工资和物价冻结。但实际上，随后价格管制的范围不断扩大，直至1974年美国政府才完全取消对物价的干预。这期间，除特殊情况外，所有商品和服务涨价都需要经过政府审批。1972年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至3%以下。这一次价格管制，被视为美国经济史上和平时期政府全面干预价格的一个特例，也被认为是一次失败的尝试。这是因为，限价措施在抑制物价上涨的同时，也严重打击了生产企业的积极性，造成社会商品供应不足，为后来通胀的恶化埋下伏笔。1974年尼克松因“水门事件”下台，新总统卡特上台，价格管制措施逐步失效。略显滑稽的是，尼克松和卡特政府均尝试通过口头“劝诫”来管控物价。例如，卡特刚上台时曾鼓励民众买“便宜货”：“要敢于向他人炫耀，自己专挑便宜货买，并为此感到自豪”。这些劝诫对于管控物价几乎是徒劳的，美国CPI通胀率自1973年4月重新破5%，此后一路上行并于1974年12月达到12.3%的阶段高点。1973年和1979年的一次粮食危机和两次石油危机，展示了供给冲击对美国物价的破坏力。1973年，前苏联谷物受恶劣天气影响而歉收，继而进入国际市场大量购买粮食，引发了二战以来最为严重的粮食危机。1973年末，美国食品CPI同比增速一度升破20%。1973年10月至1974年3月，第一次石油危机爆发：以沙特为首的石油输出国组织成员国宣布，对赎罪日战争期间支持以色列的国家实施石油禁运，美国首当其冲。世界银行原油均价由1973年9月的2.7美元/桶，跃升至1974年初的13美元/桶，涨幅接近500%。1974年3-9月，美国能源CPI同比增速均超过30%。1979年初至1980年初，第二次石油危机爆发：伊朗爆发伊斯兰革命，而后伊朗和伊拉克爆发“两伊战争”，导致全球石油产量锐减。世界银行国际油价由1978年12月的不到15美元/桶升，至1979年11月的40美元/桶以上。1980年3月，美国能源CPI同比达到47.1%的峰值，美国CPI同比也随即达到14.8%的顶点。1970-80年，美国标题通胀率持续超调后，通胀预期失控，在工会力量助推下，“工资-物价螺旋”逐渐形成。在CPI通胀率连续多年高于2%、甚至高于5%后，美国居民对物价失去原有的信心，通胀预期上升。当时，无论是美联储还是市场，对于通胀预期的认知和跟踪都比较有限。当下广泛引用的密歇根大学调查和克利夫兰联储模型预期，在1980年前后才陆续诞生。美国最早的通胀预期监测工具是1946年诞生的利文斯顿调查（The Livingston Survey），它总结了来自企业、政府、银行业和学术界的通胀预测。该调查显示，1970年以后美国通胀预期逐渐走高，尤其两次石油危机后，通胀预期也随标题通胀率陡然上升。通胀预期对于物价的反向影响主要通过工资传导：劳工要求涨薪，继而居民的消费能力与企业的成本压力上升，同时促成物价上涨，即形成“工资-物价螺旋”。尤其是，1970年代美国工会力量庞大，工资诉求的传导较为通畅：据美国劳工统计局（BLS）数据，当时美国工会成员占社会总雇员的近三成，每年发生千人以上罢工运动高达200-400起（2000年以后这一数字已常年低于30起）。1976年中至1978年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至5-7%左右，但美国非农非管理人员平均时薪同比增速达到6-8%、持续高于CPI通胀率。工资上涨的粘性阻碍了通胀的进一步回落，并为后来通胀的反弹做铺垫。1970-79年，美联储的政策应对较为消极，持续“落后于曲线”，未能有效遏制通胀。1980年以前，美国政策利率与通胀走势呈现较强同步性，体现了美联储在较长的时间里都在“落后于曲线”、“追赶曲线”。1969年5月，在通胀率破5%后的第三个月，美国政策利率才开始明显上升并超过通胀率3个百分点以上，此后通胀率保持上升了半年左右才开始回落。1973年下半年，美国通胀率仍在上升的情况下，美联储迫于经济压力而降息，继而通胀率加速上升。1978年，美国政策利率与通胀率基本持平，并保持亦步亦趋地上升，直到1978年12月，联邦基金月率升破10%并高出通胀率1个百分点，但很快政策利率又开始落后于通胀率。后来，当美国政策利率显著高于即期通胀率后，通胀才明显回落，美联储在遏制通胀方面才算拥有了主动：1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储大幅升息抗击通胀；1981年中，美国政策利率到达19%以上的高峰，同年10月CPI环比和同比同时下降；此后联邦基金利率持续高于CPI通胀率4-9个百分点不等，通胀率持续回落。02、美联储的“ 过” 与“ 功”1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因既包括对通胀与货币政策的关系认知不足，也包括货币政策的独立性缺失。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。2.1、美联储犹豫的原因1970-1979年，美联储持续“落后于曲线”，原因是多方面的。首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”。当时，美联储对于高通胀的成因出现分歧，并倾向于认为通胀主要由非货币因素造成，继而货币政策选择消极应对。例如，1970年，伯恩斯领导的美联储认为，工会力量引发了成本推动型通胀，继而主张动用“收入政策”调控，而不愿收紧货币供给。这也推动了尼克松政府后来实施的工资和物价冻结。1974年，伯恩斯又认为，“不恰当的财政纪律”是导致通胀的主因。其次，美联储在当时的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”。1970年代以前，凯恩斯主义理念主导货币政策逻辑，美联储专注于总需求管理，并坚信菲利普斯曲线（失业率与通胀的负相关性）的存在。因此，美联储将货币政策的首要目标落脚在实现“充分就业”，希望维持较低且稳定的失业率水平，继而当失业率上升时，货币政策的天平更向就业市场倾斜。当“滞”与“胀”同时发生时，美联储一度认为通胀不会继续恶化。例如，1978-79年米勒领导的美联储认为，只要失业率在充分就业水平之上（5.5%以上），货币宽松就不会加深通胀。最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1970-1978年担任主席的伯恩斯、以及1978-79年任职的米勒，均受到时任总统的影响而缺乏独立性，在平衡通胀与经济增长的关系时摇摆不定。事后来看，1970年代美联储对通胀的容忍可能正是执政者所希望看到的：一方面，执政者不希望美联储因遏制通胀而破坏经济增长、影响选票；另一方面，较高的通胀也被视为一种隐性的税收手段，因名义工资上涨提高了整个税收体系的累进程度，使财政收入大幅上升。数据显示，美国个人所得税占GDP比重在1969-70年、1974年以及1979-83年的高通胀时期，均有明显上升。2.2、沃尔克时代的功绩1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀为己任，坚定地加息和控制货币供给，虽然“制造”了经济衰退，但也最终战胜了通胀。1979 年8月，沃尔克就任美联储主席，其采取了以弗里德曼为代表的“货币学派”观点，其领导的美联储更加明确了货币政策对于物价稳定的核心地位，并将货币供给（M1）增速纳入货币政策目标，继而大幅加息，使联邦基金利率高于CPI通胀率，以达到控制货币供给的目标。1980年3月，沃尔克曾实施了一次不甚明智但短暂的信贷控制试验（“特别信贷限制计划”），以期减缓加息幅度，但随后又重启货币政策紧缩，并最终在1981年中将联邦基金利率一度推升至20%以上的峰值。大幅加息虽然带来了经济衰退，但最终帮助通胀回落。此外，在沃尔克和格林斯潘时代，美联储建立了新的“名义锚”，以稳定通胀预期并重塑美联储的信誉，这也是日后美国物价回归长期稳定的重要背景。1980年代，在经历“大滞胀”后，原本的物价稳定预期遭遇严重损害。即便在沃尔克时代，美联储明确了货币供给目标、坚定地提高了利率，但货币政策的可信度仍受质疑。公众并不清楚美联储能否长期保持对通胀的重视，并有能力影响中长期物价走势。因此，沃尔克和其下任联储主席格林斯潘，更致力于重构稳定的通胀预期，使其成为货币政策的“名义锚”，最终重新树立货币政策的可信度。这是一个复杂而漫长的过程：沃尔克战胜通胀的经历是良好起点，而后美联储由货币供给目标转向“隐性通胀目标制”。实际操作中，美联储同时盯住“增长缺口”和“通胀预期缺口”，事实上通过泰勒规则制定政策利率，追求稳定的中长期通胀目标，实现稳定的经济增长。在通胀预期管理上，美联储通过债券收益率变动来监测通胀预期，同时加强与资本市场的沟通，增强了货币政策的可信度与市场预期的稳定性。沃尔克时代后的货币政策框架，在物价稳定方面取得了长期性成果，造就了后来的大稳健时代（Great Moderation，1984-2007年）。03、“ 软着陆” 与“ 硬着陆”1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。高通胀对于消费产生直接的抑制作用，并驱使美联储加息、进一步抑制投资。因此，衰退的程度取决于通胀的严峻性以及货币政策的应对，实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的。3.1、经济衰退的三大推手按照美国国民经济研究局（NBER）的划分，1970-80年代美国经济共出现四轮衰退：第一轮是1970年1月至11月（11个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1969年的3.2%下滑至1970年的0.2%，但经济几乎没有萎缩。而美国失业率却显著攀升，由1969年12月的3.5%升至1970年12月的6.1%（阶段高点），在此后的24个月里均保持在5%以上。第二轮是1973年12月至1975年3月（16个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1973年的5.6%断崖式下滑，曾连续5个季度同比萎缩，季度同比萎缩最深达2.3%。美国失业率连续31个月高于7%，由1973年10月阶段低点的4.6%，一路走高至1975年5月的9.0%，此后缓慢下降。第三轮是1980年2月至7月（6个月）。美国实际GDP环比折年率于1980年二季度大幅萎缩8%，不过同比仅萎缩0.8%。在这一时期，美国失业率由6.3%最高升至7.8%。1980年下半年，美国经济立即开始复苏，四季度GDP环比大幅上涨7.7%，失业率于8月开始回落。第四轮是1981年8月至1982年11月（16个月）。美国实际GDP曾连续4个季度同比萎缩、最深萎缩2.6%。美国失业率在1981年8月开始从7.2%的阶段低点显著回升，同年11月破8%，1982年11月达到10.8%的峰值，此后缓慢回落，1984年2月才降至8%以下。衰退推手之一：高通胀。比较当时的经济与通胀走势，二者呈现出十分紧密的相关性：美国经济衰退发生的节点，均对应CPI通胀率上升或触顶的时候。例如，1970年CPI通胀率触顶时点，恰好是失业率反弹与经济衰退的开端；1973-75年，这一轮失业率反弹和经济被认定为衰退的时点，都在CPI通胀率破8%以后；1980年初，当CPI通胀率触及14%以上的极高水平时，失业率显著反弹、经济开始衰退。如果衰退发生时，通胀率仍在上升，则美国经济继续下行；只有通胀率回落后，美国经济才开始复苏。例如，1970年末，直到通胀回落至5%以下，美国经济才开始复苏；1975年，当通胀率触顶回落一个季度后，美国GDP环比增速转正、失业率开始下降。通胀对经济的直接影响主要体现在消费上。相比政策利率，美国通胀率与私人消费增速的负相关性更为明显。尤其在1980年代，当政策利率大幅跃升时，通胀率已经提早回落，当时私人消费也开始回升，说明通胀缓和对于消费回暖有明显帮助。衰退推手之二：高利率。整体而言，当时美联储加息对经济的降温效应是明显的：当美国经济处于过热时，加息对经济的降温效果可谓立竿见影：如1973年中，美国制造业PMI超过60，美联储加息使“过热”的经济快速降温。当美国经济本身处于下行甚至衰退时，加息则深化了经济萎缩的幅度：如1974年中，政策利率达峰后，美国经济下行速度加快，三季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩3.7%；1980年3-4月，联邦基金月率达到17%以上的阶段高点后，同年二季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩8.0%。反之，降息可助力经济复苏：1970年12月，当政策利率降至通胀率之下时，美国经济立刻处于复苏状态；1975年初，美联储降息并使政策利率低于通胀率近5个百分点，美国经济于1975年二季度开始复苏。但是，在通胀未得到有效控制时过早地、不成熟地降息，可能会以“通胀反复+更高幅度的加息”收场，从而酿至更大程度的衰退，或延缓本应更早开始的复苏：1974年初，美联储选择降息，但由于通胀继续走高、对经济的负面影响持续，美国经济仍步入衰退；1980年5月，联邦基金月率已降至11%左右（辅以信贷管制），8月美国经济暂时脱离衰退区间，但由于此后通胀反复迫使美联储选择更大力度地加息，1981年美国经济陷入新一轮程度更深的衰退。利率对经济的影响主要体现在投资上。相比通胀，政策利率与私人投资（滞后1年）的负相关性更为明显。1980年下半年，美联储短暂降息，一年后美国私人投资明显反弹；1981年，当美联储重新大幅加息后，一年后的私人投资增速明显下滑，但该时期通胀也已明显回落，说明私人投资对利率走势更为敏感。衰退推手之三：供给冲击。1973年和1979年的粮食和石油危机，对美国经济增长造成了多方面拖累，因此都引发了经济衰退。第一，如上文提到，供给冲击抬升了CPI通胀率，消费价格上涨抑制了总需求。尤其是，供给冲击引发能源消费成本上升，并挤占了其他消费。1974年以后，美国能源产品和服务消费占私人消费比重，由冲击前的6%左右上升至7-9%，直到1985年以后才明显回落。第二，供给冲击增大了美国石油进口成本，导致GDP“蒸发”。第一次石油危机导致油价上涨约10美元/桶，1974年美国石油净进口量约为600万桶/日。我们测算，石油涨价通过增加净进口成本对美国GDP的拖累约为219亿美元，拖累GDP名义增速1.4个百分点；类似地，第二次石油危机后，石油净进口成本上升拖累了1979年美国GDP名义增速2.8个百分点。第三，供给冲击引发原材料紧缺，削弱了美国工业生产能力。1970年代的两轮供给冲击后，美国工业生产总指数同比均出现大幅下降。对比两次冲击可以发现，第一次冲击时，美国CPI通胀率较低、而PPI通胀率更高，继而工业生产所受冲击程度更深，这也体现了供给冲击对经济产出的影响更主要地表现在“供给端”。3.2、衰退程度取决于什么对于上述4轮衰退，按照GDP萎缩程度、以及衰退时长划分，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年）。1970年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀压力相对有限。当时CPI通胀率最高仅为6.2%，继而美联储也未大幅加息，政策利率最高仅为9%左右。而通胀有限，一方面是没有遭受供给冲击，另一方面也和尼克松政府的价格管制有关。1980年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀见顶回落、美联储及时降息。当时美国CPI通胀率一度达到14.8%的历史高点，联邦基金月率曾经达到17.6%，但当衰退开始时，美联储迅速降息，政策利率大幅下降至9%左右时，经济很快开始复苏。1973-75年“硬着陆”的主要原因是，供给冲击下，衰退期间通胀率仍在上行，继而政策利率也不得不跟随通胀快速上升（即使政策利率并未显著高于通胀率）；1981-82年“硬着陆”的背景是，美联储迫切希望遏制通胀，从而采取十分激进的加息措施（联邦基金利率曾达到20%左右），虽然通胀率很快开始下降，但政策利率仍持续、显著高于通胀率，使经济复苏进程延缓。由此，我们可以得出结论：“软着陆”的要求是较为苛刻的——首先，通胀压力不能太大，CPI通胀率或需要在衰退初期及时回落。其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息。最后，如果政府对价格进行过度干预，或者不幸发生了新的供给冲击，那么“软着陆”可能只是暂时的，日后通胀可能反弹、“硬着陆”更难避免。04、资产价格的线索1970-80年代，高通胀是美国经济和政策的“最大敌人”，因而通胀形势也成为资本市场的风向标。在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。此外，“大滞胀”为经济和市场带来了长期伤痛，继而美元等避险资产在较长时间里表现积极。4.1、美股：通胀是最大的敌人这一时期美股走势由通胀主导，每当通胀率调头向下，美股便立即反弹。1970年7月、1974年12月和1980年3月，对应着美国CPI通胀率的三轮顶点，同时也是标普500指数反弹的开端。这或说明，在高通胀时期，通胀走势是市场最为关注的：只要通胀居高不下，美联储就有继续紧缩的可能，美国经济便受到高通胀和高利率的共同威胁；而只要通胀回落，即便经济暂时疲弱，市场相信回落的物价有利于经济复苏、且美联储紧缩有望放松，股市便计入复苏预期。美股在衰退中期触底反弹，调整幅度不完全取决于衰退程度。在NBER定义的4轮衰退初期，美股均承压，但衰退尚未结束时，由于货币政策预期趋松、通胀压力开始缓和，市场复苏预期增强，美股往往率先迎来反弹。换言之，“政策底”领先于“市场底”，“市场底”又领先于“经济底”。从数据上看，标普500指数的底部均出现在衰退时期内。不过，美股调整幅度并不完全取决于衰退程度：1970年和1980年的“软着陆”中，以及1981-82年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅均不超过20%；只有1973-75年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅接近40%。从反弹幅度看，四轮衰退和美股调整后，美股反弹都是较为强劲的，标普500指数由低谷反弹的幅度均超30%。其背后的逻辑或许在于：“软着陆”后的市场整体保持乐观，“硬着陆”后的市场虽然没有那么乐观，但由于此前“基数”较低，美股的性价比仍能吸引资金流入。这意味着，无论衰退程度如何，只要找准底部适度“前倾”布局美股，均有可能获得不错的收益。美联储不是美股“永远的敌人”。对比1970年后和1980年后的美股表现，即便1980年后美国CPI通胀率更高、美联储加息更为激进、衰退程度也不弱，但美股的整体表现显著好于1970年代。1970年代，标普500指数在波动中几乎保持横盘，而1980年以后标普500指数维持震荡上行趋势。尤其对比1973-75年和1981-82年，都是“硬着陆”，但后者美股下跌幅度更小、反弹幅度更大。两段时期最大的区别在于，后者美联储紧缩力度更强，在“制造”衰退中可能发挥了更重要的作用。在美联储激进加息过程中，通胀率显著下降：一方面缓解了高通胀对经济增长的抑制，另一方面市场对于美联储更有信心，继而令复苏预期更强、风险偏好更高。此外，1980年后，“里根经济学”登上历史舞台，在市场充分而痛苦地出清后，美国生产率快速提升。因而，美股受到通胀可控后的政策利率下降、以及上市公司盈利增长的“双轮驱动”，反弹更为强劲。从这个角度来看，通胀才是美股“最大的敌人”，而美联储不是；有能力遏制通胀的美联储，反而最终成为了美股的“朋友”！4.2、美债：与货币政策“共舞”1970年代，美债市场经历了一段长期熊市，高通胀和高利率共同驱动美债利率上行。但是，10年美债利率的波幅明显小于CPI通胀率和政策利率的波幅。值得一提的是，美国经济衰退与美债利率的相关性并不明显：在1970年、1974-75年、1980年和1982年的四轮衰退前后，10年美债利率在第一轮有所回落，第二轮震荡上行，第三轮大幅走高，第四轮震荡偏强。这或体现了美联储货币政策逻辑的演进过程，即对通胀的重视不断提高、对经济的兼顾不断弱化。继而随时间推移，市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。直到1982年三季度以后，当CPI通胀率低于5%、GDP同比萎缩时，市场相信美联储能够心无旁骛地降息，美债利率才明显走低。1980年代，10年美债利率走势与政策利率走势更加紧密。1980-81年，美国CPI通胀率呈下行走势，但10年美债利率快速上行，主要由货币政策强力紧缩驱动。1982年以后，10年美债利率与政策利率波动趋势比较贴合，这体现了沃尔克时代货币政策改革的成效，即美联储对债券利率的驱动力显著提升。虽然10年美债利率与政策利率“共舞”，但波动幅度更小。1970年代以前，10年美债利率与联邦基金利率的绝对水平和走势都很相近。1970年代，当高通胀到来、美联储加息时，10年美债利率虽然也会上升，但上升幅度更小，继而“跑输”政策利率。原因在于：一方面，高通胀和高利率的出现，降低了市场风险偏好，美债发挥了一定避险属性；另一方面，市场出于对经济增长的担忧，怀疑高利率的可持续性，继而压低了中长端美债利率（美债期限溢价为负）。当通胀回落、美联储降息后，10年美债利率虽也回落，但幅度仍然有限，使美债利率“跑赢”政策利率，这一现象的原因或许在通胀预期的上升。事实上，1983年以后，10年美债利率下降幅度不足，一度成为美联储面临的新问题：美国通胀率已回落至2%附近，但由于市场通胀预期仍未及时回落，债券市场利率下降缓慢，阻碍了经济复苏。后来，沃尔克领导的美联储开始将债券市场利率视为通胀预期的标尺，更加重视对通胀预期的管理，10年美债利率走势才进一步贴合政策利率。4.3、美元：多因素造就强美元美联储加息、市场避险需求上升、非美经济受冲击等因素，共同造就了1981-84年的强势美元。1970年代，布雷顿森林体系崩溃造成美元汇率迅速贬值，这一时期的美元汇率与美国经济和货币周期相关性不强。1981-84年，美元汇率持续走强，美元指数由1980年下半年的85左右，一度升破160的历史峰值；直到1985年《广场协议》签署，强势美元才得以终结。如何理解这一时期的强势美元？首先，1980年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储严格控制货币供给，美元的稀缺性上升；第二，1981-82年，美国经济因美联储激进加息而陷入衰退，美股经历明显调整，经济和市场风险激发了美元的避险属性；第三，1983-84年，美国经济告别了高通胀，步入强劲复苏，美联储政策利率和美债利率仍维持着相对高位。这一时期美元汇率仍在走强：一方面，市场对美联储的信心提升；另一方面，前期美联储紧缩对非美经济的外溢效应显现（如1982-85年拉美深陷债务危机），这使美元资产具备十足的吸引力。值得一提的是，在美联储激进加息时期，美元指数和美债利率均呈上行趋势。不过，美元汇率的反应滞后于美债利率：例如1980年6月，10年美债利率已经开始快速上行，而美元指数的上行滞后了3个月左右；1984年6月，10年美债利率受市场降息预期影响而开始回落，但美元指数的回落滞后了9个月。05、对当下的新启示1、本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限。类似1970年代，当前美国的高通胀同样是货币和财政宽松、美联储行动迟缓、供给冲击等多重因素交织的结果。但对比来看，我们倾向于认为美国通胀不会像当时那般失控：第一，这一次美国政府并未像当年尼克松政府那样实施粗暴的价格管制，价格信号对供需的平衡作用并未消失，降低了日后通胀反复的风险；第二，当前美国“工资-物价”螺旋风险相对更低，一方面得益于目前仍较稳定的中长期通胀预期，另一方面得益于美国工会力量的长期削弱；第三，当前美国消化“石油危机”的能力更强，尤其2010年页岩油革命后，美国能源消费占私人消费总额的比重已下降，美国也从原油的净进口国转变为净出口国，因此油价对美国核心通胀率的传导下降。因此，即便当前美国CPI能源分项同比增速高达40%、达到1970-80年代两次石油危机的程度，但核心CPI通胀率明显低于当时。2、本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动。货币政策的“反复无常”，以及市场对货币政策缺乏信心，是1970-80年代滞胀反复的重要背景。对比来看，美联储如今掌握更多主动，即便在2021年低估了通胀的可持续性（“通胀暂时论”），但这一错误或仍有挽回的余地：首先，在认识和应对“滞胀”上，如今美联储已不再“摸着石头过河”，货币政策早已明确“物价稳定”的目标。今年以来，美联储宣称“物价稳定”是“最大就业”的前提，将遏制通胀视为货币政策的首要任务。其次，沃尔克-格林斯潘时代后，美联储监控通胀预期的能力更强（如2000年以后通胀保值债券诞生），与市场沟通的效率更高，建立了较为良好的信誉。今年以来，美联储紧缩信号显著抬升了美债名义利率，资本市场的敏捷反应折射出货币政策的可信性。当下美国通胀预期并未“脱锚”，克利夫兰联储模型监测的十年通胀预期不超过2.5%，远不及1980年代4-5%的水平。最后，如今美联储的独立性更强。当前，通胀是拜登政府和美联储共同面对的“敌人”，美联储紧缩受到总统的支持。即便未来经济压力加大、总统向美联储施压，预计美联储也会较为坚定地捍卫信誉。正如鲍威尔领导的美联储曾在2018年四次加息，不顾时任总统特朗普的批评一样。3、本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险。1970-80年代，当美国CPI通胀率升高至5%以上时，经济衰退便如期而至。对比当前：第一，今年美国CPI通胀率最高达到9.1%，不仅超过了此前触发衰退的水平，且已超过1970年美国经济“软着陆”时期水平；第二，当前美联储表现出很大决心遏制通胀，或将政策利率维持在“足够限制性水平（sufficiently restrictive level）”较长时间，不惜付出经济衰退的代价（参考我们此前报告《美联储信誉保卫战》）。这意味着，类似1981-82年沃尔克时期，本次美联储紧缩力度可能足以“制造”一场衰退；第三，目前尚不能排除未来通胀反复的风险。如果未来不幸发生了新的供给冲击，或者美联储实际紧缩力度不足（如未来当美国经济切实进入衰退、政治压力上升、或发生金融风险时，美联储过早停止紧缩甚至降息），那么美国通胀仍可能反复，从而酿至更大程度的衰退。4、本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性。1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。类似1970-80年代，当前通胀走势与美股表现也有较强相关性。今年上半年，随着美国CPI通胀率不断上升，美股迎来一轮深度调整；6月中旬至8月中旬，大宗商品价格与通胀预期降温，美股阶段性反弹；8月下旬以来，随着高通胀的持续性超出预期，美联储政策取向更加强硬，美股对货币政策的关注加强，上演了新一轮“紧缩恐慌”。未来一段时间美股市场或仍将承压，类似1981-82年沃尔克抗击通胀并“制造”衰退的时期。1981-82年，虽然美国CPI通胀率持续回落，但美联储紧缩对经济和股市造成冲击。类似地，当前美联储似乎想要重回“沃尔克时代”，势必确保通胀回落，不惜付出衰退代价。目前，美国通胀仍处高位、经济尚未实质性衰退，市场对衰退的计价尚不充分，后续美股或仍有调整空间。从历史经验看，美股在经济衰退初期仍可能下跌，直到衰退中后期货币政策开始放松，美股才迎来持续性反弹。不过，美联储不会是美股“永远的敌人”，若美联储顺利帮助通胀回落，美股调整幅度或不会太深。1981-92年沃尔克“制造”衰退时，美股调整幅度相对有限，并未跌破1980年初的底部。美联储大力抗击通胀虽带来“短痛”，但可避免通胀反复的“长痛”。考虑到，本轮通胀形势比1970-80年代还更乐观一些，美联储行动也不算太过被动，这一轮美股调整幅度或不会太深、反弹也可能较历史经验更提前一些。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松时。类似1970-80年代，当前10年美债利率的核心影响因素也是货币政策。1970-80年代的经验是，债券市场在“衰退交易”和“紧缩交易”之间徘徊。但随着美联储抗击通胀更加坚决，债券市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。今年7月，因通胀预期降温、衰退预期升温，10年美债利率明显回落。但8月下旬以来，随着美联储政策取向更加强硬，市场更加关注紧缩，因而近期10年美债利率持续反弹并已升破4%，超过6月中旬3.5%的阶段高点。如果美联储在衰退时也坚持紧缩，那么衰退初期10年美债利率未必很快回落。正如在1981-82年美国经济衰退初期，即便美国CPI通胀率已由高点明显回落，但与2%的目标仍有很大距离，货币政策并未放松，10年美债利率保持在高位。我们预计，即便2023年上半年美国经济开始衰退，但美联储可能选择坚持紧缩、不会降息，债市可能也不会过早交易衰退。10年美债利率下降或需政策利率实质性下降。1982年下半年，美国CPI通胀率回落至5%以下、经济衰退程度较深时，美联储开始大幅降息，美债牛市才真正开启。且注意到，当时政策利率下降的起点领先于10年美债利率、下降幅度也更深。这意味着，待货币政策明确开始放松后，10年美债利率或才能明显下降。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元汇率回落或需美债利率回落中周期看，当前“强势美元”的逻辑与1980年代十分相似。1980-84年，美元指数走出了“历史大顶”，即便期间美联储降息，美元汇率也长期保持强势。当前，支撑美元的逻辑与1980年代十分相似：美国经济相对非美地区有明显优势，美联储紧缩底气强于其他发达经济体。往后看，即便美国经济由“滞胀”走向“衰退”，非美经济金融风险也未必消除（这从今年欧洲、日本债券和汇率市场波动中便可窥见一斑），反而市场对美元资产的信任会增强（如当前比特币等加密货币已然走弱）。因此，至少在未来1-2年，美元指数波动中枢有望持续高于新冠疫情前水平。短周期看，美债利率或是判断美元走势的“领先性指标”。1980年，10年美债利率早于美元指数开启上行周期；1984-85年，10年美债利率先于美元指数回落。事实上，过往的市场表现也基本印证了美债利率对美元指数的领先性：在10年美债利率触顶回落后的1-3个月，美元指数通常也见顶回落。如前所述，本轮美债牛市的开启或需等到衰退兑现且货币政策趋松，在此之后美元指数触顶回落迹象或才能日渐清晰。风险提示：1、美国经济韧性不及预期。虽然美国服务业复苏仍有空间，但高通胀和高利率环境下，居民消费信心不足或压制实际消费，继而使经济增长状况弱于基准预期；随着美联储加息和需求降温，美国就业市场降温节奏或超预期。2、发生新的供给冲击。如果未来新的供给冲击发生，并再度抬升国际能源、食品等商品价格，美国“滞胀”压力或将显著抬升，美联储可能不得不“制造”衰退才能遏制通胀，市场情绪将转为悲观。3、美联储紧缩力度不足或过强。如果美联储紧缩力度不足造成通胀反复，美联储后续治理通胀的成本更大；如果美联储紧缩力度明显强于市场预期，市场波动风险或将上升并可能最终威胁实体经济。4、非美地区经济金融风险超预期等。当前欧洲、亚洲等大型经济体的经济金融风险出现上升迹象。如果未来发生大型经济金融风险事件，美国经济和市场或受到波及。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".IXIC":0.9,".SPX":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1152,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668629318,"gmtCreate":1664673789438,"gmtModify":1676537491579,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"title":"","htmlText":".","listText":".","text":".","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668629318","repostId":"1153575084","repostType":2,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":726,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668099880,"gmtCreate":1664283926741,"gmtModify":1676537424911,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"title":"","htmlText":"6","listText":"6","text":"6","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668099880","repostId":"661483449","repostType":1,"repost":{"id":661483449,"gmtCreate":1664184790755,"gmtModify":1676537405312,"author":{"id":"3527667568191018","authorId":"3527667568191018","name":"胖虎福利","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/733bbf790057cc91c5e0b1aa5569977c","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3527667568191018","idStr":"3527667568191018"},"themes":[],"title":"一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜？特斯拉2022 AI Day即將揭曉答案","htmlText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","listText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","text":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","images":[{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9327ca5b98a1761a3de3864f295c901","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/058669d709b4bda6ca11888f1fe825bf","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/67256fa209e44b7ae28ffda3f04db43a","width":"-1","height":"-1"}],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":2,"paper":2,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/661483449","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":0,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":4,"langContent":"CN","totalScore":0},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":700,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}
